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The Institutional Architecture of CFSP 
after the Lisbon Treaty – 
Constitutional breakthrough or 
challenges ahead? 
 
Wolfgang Wessels and Franziska Bopp 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the institutional architecture of CFSP and the 
overall external action of the Union. The Lisbon Treaty has introduced some remarkable changes 
which might substantially influence the (inter-)institutional balance in this policy field. The authors 
offer two different possible readings of the CFSP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty: they could be 
interpreted as a major step forward in the direction of a strengthened, more coherent and more 
effective international actor with more supranational elements; but they may also be seen as 
demonstrating an ever-refined mode of ‘rationalised intergovernmentalism’. After an in-depth 
analysis of the ideas and norms contained in the new treaty, the institutions and the instruments, the 
authors find more evidence for the second interpretation, but also traces for a ‘ratched fusion’ as a 
third alternative explanation. 
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THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF CFSP 
AFTER THE LISBON TREATY –  
CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKTHROUGH OR 
CHALLENGES AHEAD? 
WOLFGANG WESSELS AND FRANZISKA BOPP
* 
1.  The Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: Historical and 
theoretical perspectives on a sui generis policy field 
1.1  CFSP/CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty: Steps of treaty-making 
The role of the European Union as a global actor in the international system has always been a 
central part of the European integration process and continuous efforts have been made to en-
hance the effectiveness and efficiency of the Union’s external action. The Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and its antecedent, the European Political Cooperation (EPC), are key 
elements of European integration. They serve as significant points of reference of national for-
eign policies, especially due to the rapid developments in this field since the end of the 1990s, 
leading some authors to speak about an “almost revolutionary change in member state commit-
ments” (Smith, 2003: 556). Thus, the provisions for CFSP and, increasingly also the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),
1 can be regarded as the cornerstone of the Lisbon Treaty. 
Furthermore, the challenges the Union faces within the international system are ever growing 
and requiring an ever-increasing scope of action across different policy fields, geographical re-
gions and arenas of policy-making. This makes the policy field a very relevant, although some-
times diffusing research area as three types of foreign interactions intertwine: traditional na-
tional foreign policy, the foreign policy of the EU as prescribed in the treaty articles on CFSP 
and CSDP, and the EC external relations, which concentrate on long-standing and mostly eco-
nomic foreign relations and development policy (cf. Carlsnaes, 2007). The CFSP as ‘original’ 
foreign policy is thus embedded in a whole range of other policies with implications for external 
action. This includes not only traditional community policy fields such as trade or development 
policy with direct links to external action but also policy fields that are comparatively ‘new’ on 
the EU agenda and whose foreign implications seem – at least at the beginning – rather indirect, 
such as Justice and Home Affairs or Environmental Policy.  
                                                      
* Wolfgang Wessels is holder of the Jean Monnet Chair and Professor of Political Science at the Research 
Institute for Political Science and European Affairs, University of Cologne, Germany. Prof. Wessels is 
member of several editorial and executive boards as well as think tanks. His research interests include in-
stitutions and procedures of the EU, theories of European politics and integration and the European Union 
in the international system. He is co-ordinator of the “Network of Excellence” EU-CONSENT, supported 
by the Commissions 6
th Framework Programme. He is winner of the Gold “2007 Lifelong Learning 
Award”. 
Franziska Bopp is Research Assistant and PhD candidate at the University of Cologne. She obtained her 
university degree in Latin American Studies in 2007 with a final thesis on EU Migration Policy. Her cur-
rent research interests focus on EU's Migration Policy and JHA, CFSP/ESDP and the EU’s external rela-
tions (esp. with Latin America). She works for the FP 6 “Network of Excellence” EU-CONSENT and is 
involved in the FP6 integrated project ‘Liberty and Security for Europe’ (CHALLENGE). 
1 In this article we will use the abbreviation CSDP as the respective chapter is called in the Lisbon Treaty 
although ESDP has been established even in the official language use.  2 | WESSELS & BOPP 
 
The perceived problem of lack of coherence and efficiency in the Union’s external action rose 
with its growing scope of tasks around the world (cf. Nuttall, 2005). With the Constitutional 
Treaty, a first attempt was made to resolve some of these problems – but this project was re-
jected in the French and Dutch negative referenda in 2005. After the so-called ‘reflection 
phase’, the German Presidency re-launched the debate on the future of Europe. In the 2-page 
‘Berlin Declaration’, which was signed during the celebrations of the 50
th anniversary of the 
Rome Treaties, the Union repeated its claim to take a “leading role” in the promotion of free-
dom and development and the fight against poverty, hunger and disease in the world and 
stressed its commitment “to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the world”.
2  
At the June 2007 European Council in Brussels, the heads of state and government then agreed 
on a mandate for a new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), which should draw up a new 
Treaty and “complete its work as quickly as possible, and in any case before the end of 2007”.
3 
In the mandate, the IGC was called to draw up a Treaty “with a view to enhancing the efficiency 
and democratic legitimacy of the enlarged Union, as well as the coherence of its external ac-
tion”.
4 The text further completely rejected the constitutional ambitions: “The constitutional 
concept, which consisted in repealing all existing Treaties and replacing them by a single text 
called ‘Constitution’, is abandoned” (…). The TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
Union will not have a constitutional character.”
5 Thus leaving aside the ambitious constitutional 
project, most of the terminology associated with a ‘constitution’ has been modified: The treaty 
is not called ‘Constitution’, the ‘Foreign Minister’ is renamed ‘High Representative of the Un-
ion for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’ and the terms ‘law’ and ‘framework law’ will be 
abandoned. Apart from these rather ‘cosmetic’ changes, the treaty provisions for CFSP in the 
Treaty of Lisbon are basically the same as in the Constitutional Treaty.
6 Exceptions are an 
amendment of Art. 24 TEU
7 relating to the exception of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, a 
separate clause on data protection within CFSP, and the exclusion of CFSP and CSDP from Art. 
352 TFEU,
8 which allows the additional transfer of competences to the Union in order to reach 
the common objectives (cf. Statewatch Analysis, 2007). Two new declarations concerning 
CFSP have also been added as had been foreseen by the IGC mandate.
9 The first states that the 
CFSP does not affect “the responsibilities of the Member States (…) for the formulation and 
conduct of their foreign policy nor of their national representation in third countries and interna-
tional organisations” and that these provisions “do not prejudice the specific character of the se-
curity and defence policy of the Member States” (Declaration No. 13). This provision stems 
from the former Art. 17 (1) TEU (Nice) and the related Protocol. A similar formulation can be 
found in the new Declaration No. 14 which also stresses that the CFSP provisions “do not give 
new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the Euro-
pean Parliament”. A first reading of the document indicates that the CFSP – even if perhaps not 
more a ‘second pillar’ – is in legal terms still based on a special set of provisions, as also stated 
                                                      
2 Presidency of the Council, 2007, part II.  
3 European Council, 2007b: 2. 
4 European Council, 2007b: 15. 
5 European Council, 2007b: 16. 
6 In this paper, we will concentrate on the analysis of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty in comparison 
with the current Treaty of Nice without special reference to the Constitutional Treaty. Thus, unless indi-
cated otherwise, the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty are the same as in the Constitutional Treaty. 
7 The numbering of articles in this paper follows the future consolidated version as laid down in Art. 5 of 
the Lisbon Treaty. 
8 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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in Art. 24 TEU which stresses that “[t]he common foreign and security policy is subject to spe-
cific rules and procedures”.  
Before we analyse and assess in detail the new treaty provisions and their impact on the Union’s 
external coherence and its capability to act in the international system – as the mandate for the 
IGC 2007 required – some general remarks about the related academic debate will help to con-
ceptualise the issue. Many scientific and political contributions have been made to assess the 
‘actorness’ of the Union and, more specificly, its role in the international system (cf. Smith, 
2006; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006; Wessels, 2005; Wessels & Regelsberger, 2005; Tonra & 
Christiansen, 2004; Knodt & Princen, 2003; White, 2001; Rhodes, 1998; and CFSP Forum). 
Basically, two “indispensable concepts” (Hill, 1993: 308) have been developed: actorness and 
presence (cf. Smith, 2006: 290). Whereas the former sees the EU as on its way towards a full-
fledged, state-like international ‘actorness’ (Sjöstedt, 1977), the latter qualifies the Union as a 
growing and increasingly important ‘presence’ in the international system (Allen & Smith, 
1990, 1998). A third interpretation sees the Union itself as a process, which structures the EU 
internally and its external environment (cf. Smith, 2006: 290). Whereas most of the analysts 
agree that the Union is some kind of global actor
10 – an assumption that is strengthened by the 
acquisition of legal personality as foreseen in the new Art. 47 TEU – different opinions exist 
about the quality of this actorness and the genuine identity of the Union: it is an “important 
though strange actor” (Wessels & Regelsberger, 2005: 91). More and more research focuses on 
the character of the Union’s identity and the (self)perception of the Union as an international ac-
tor.  
In the academic as well as political debate, many efforts have been made to conceptualise the 
EU’s international role, describing it as a “superpower” (Blair, 2000; Galtung, 1973), “civilian 
power” (Blauberger, 2005; Whitman, 1998; Bull, 1982; Duchêne, 1972), “soft power” (Nye, 
2004), “peace power” (Ehrhart, 2005), “normative power” (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007; Man-
ners, 2006, 2002), “l’Europe puissance” (Lefebvre, 2004; Solana, 2001) and recently also as a 
“model power” (Miliband, 2007) or “smart power” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2008). The Union’s iden-
tity can thus be based upon its way of acting or of intervening in the international environment 
(civilian/military), its aims/objectives (promotion of certain norms and values) or upon its eco-
nomic power. The basic underlying assumption behind many of these categorisations is that the 
EU is a sui generis entity (Bretherton & Vogler, 2006: 35), a kind of “post-modern” unit (cf. 
Smith, 2003) acting on the basis of other rationales than the modern state and thus trying to pur-
sue its goals by cooperation and dialogue rather than a balance of power logic (cf. Tocci, 2007). 
The diversity and heterogeneity of the different contributions exemplify the scientific and politi-
cal efforts that are made to identify, analyse and explain this rapidly changing policy field.  
1.2  Two contrasting readings 
The Lisbon Treaty is the latest result of a range of treaty reforms and its inherent legal construc-
tion of the institutional architecture of CFSP and CSDP allows for a range of different readings 
and interpretations. In this paper we will start from two antagonistic perspectives. The first in-
terprets the CFSP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty as a major step forward towards the estab-
lishment of a growing and strengthened global identity of the EU which – despite the complex-
ity of the treaty provisions – has strengthened its international identity as an actor with increased 
military capacities for implementation of its aims and objectives. In the perspective of a “ratchet 
fusion process” (Wessels, 2005: 94; Wessels, 2001; see also Miles, 2003, 2006) this would 
mean that the CFSP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty have provided for a major step upward to-
wards the “next plateau” of an “integration ladder”, representing a gradual move towards a sys-
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tem with clear supranational elements. This would also mean that the often-claimed coherence 
of the Union’s external action and its capability to act have been enhanced towards a stronger 
and more coherent international actor with a strengthened identity in the international system 
and more capabilities to act while internal efficiency and transparency have been enhanced. In 
Figure 1 this would mean a step towards the highest end of Plateau II, but not yet towards Pla-
teau III. In this view the Lisbon Treaty would be the last treaty revision of CFSP issues for the 
time being. 
Figure 1. The integration ‘cascade’: A micro view of “ratchet fusion“ 
Source: Based on Wessels & Regelsberger (2005: 113).  
On the other hand, the treaty provisions can be interpreted as demonstrating an ever-refined type 
of “rationalised intergovernmentalism” (Wessels, 2001: 204) whereby the heads of state and 
government grant limited roles to the EP and the Commission but stick to unanimity in the 
Council and the central role of the European Council. In the line of this argument, transfers of 
competences go along with increased complexity and differentiation in decision-making proce-
dures. In this reading, the Lisbon Treaty does not constitute a major step upwards in the integra-
tion process but just some minor adoptions on the former plateau without a real ‘upgrading’. 
The member states have retained control of all important issues and are merely “using” CFSP 
provisions to pursue their own, national goals. This would imply that internal as well as external 
coherence have not been strengthened due to a growing complexity and inter-institutional ten-
sions and national reservations about ‘real’ transfers of competence. 
Following the argumentation of the second reading we would assume that the Lisbon Treaty 
does not constitute a constitutional breakthrough but that the heads of state and government 
have even more moved into the intergovernmental trap (Klein & Wessels, 2006). At the same 
time the capability-expectations gap (Hill, 1993, 1998) has been widened by ambitious formula-
tions regarding the role of the EU as an international actor while the institutional and procedural 
provisions have not been altered correspondingly. From this intergovernmentalist reading the 
CFSP is seen as a mere “agent” (Kassim & Menon, 2003, Pollack, 2006) of the member states 
as “principals” and “masters” of national governments which seek to pursue their national inter-
ests and strengthen their position in the international system via the Union’s institutional set-up. 
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In the case of a “high-politics” (Hoffmann, 1966) crisis, the Treaty provisions will then not pro-
vide the Union with optimal tools for action. Thus, when faced with such an output failure, the 
heads of state and government might try to upgrade the relevant provisions, but they will not be 
able and willing to pass the threshold of the defence of national sovereignty which in the end 
prevents the establishment of a more effective, efficient and coherent Union. In this sense the 
Lisbon Treaty would signify another step towards ever-refined modes of intergovernmental 
governance in the sovereignty-loaded policy fields of CFSP. The Lisbon provisions will then 
not have moved the CFSP to a higher level of the integration ladder, remaining in the middle of 
Plateau II as indicated in Figure 1.  
As indicators we will analyse the CFSP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty taking into account the 
ideas and objectives inherent in the treaty which express the self-perception of the Union’s in-
ternational role, the provisions for the different institutions, the procedures governing the in-
volvement of the institutions in decision-making and the instruments and resources. This will 
help us to assess if the CFSP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide the Union with the neces-
sary tools and procedures for effective action and thus can be regarded as last treaty revision – 
at least for the time being – or if the new legal framework poses new challenges to the Union 
which might soon lead to a further treaty reform. 
Where possible, we will add some preliminary expectations about the impact of these written 
treaty letters – the architecture of the “legal constitution” (Olsen, 2000: 7) – on the daily prac-
tice, i.e. the architecture of the “living constitution”. Against the background of the experiences 
gained so far and regarding the enlargement to 27 members at the beginning of 2007, it should 
be considered if and how the actors of the CFSP will be able to use and/or eventually avoid or 
extrapolate the new legal prescriptions. The governments, diplomats and holders of the new po-
sitions are moving within a field of rules containing possible incentives, but also constraints for 
their action (Olsen, 2002; Scharpf & Treib, 2000; Scharpf, 1997). Can we expect the institutions 
of the European Union to strengthen norms for the ‘normal’ behaviour in the daily practice 
(Wessels, 2003a)? Will they develop a more sustainable ‘common’ foreign and security policy? 
These questions not only depend on the form of the institutional architecture – the ‘opportunity 
structures’ – but also on the mind and style with which the relevant individuals (the leading 
chiefs of governments) use the offered rules and especially on the kind of external or internal 
challenges they might face. This will be of special relevance in sudden, unforeseen cases of cri-
sis. As we have no practical experiences of the implementation of this recently signed treaty, 
this part of the analysis is only based on preliminary theses and on previous experiences. 
2.  The ‘new CFSP’: New options and old conflicts 
The CFSP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, which are – with some exceptions – the same as in 
the Constitutional Treaty (for the debate on the Constitutional Treaty see Klein & Wessels, 
2006), foresee a range of changes in comparison to the current legal basis, the Nice Treaty. For 
a detailed analysis of the treaty provisions it is necessary to find and analyse the relevant articles 
containing the ideas on objectives, relevant institutions and procedures as well as legal instru-
ments and operative and financial resources for the external action of the EU (for an overview, 
see Figure 2). After analysing the relevant articles, the new legal framework should be tested 
regarding its capability to overcome crises and its adequacy for the Union’s daily work. Thus it 
has to be discussed if the new regulations – when compared to the current Nice Treaty – allow 
for more efficiency in decision-taking and more coherence in the external representation as the 
mandate for the IGC 2007 required.
11  
                                                      
11 European Council, 2007b: 15.  
Figure 2. CFSP/CSDP and other areas of external action in the Lisbon Treaty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own graph based on Wessels, 2003b. Abbreviations: Art: Article; HR: High Representative; COM: European Commission, QM: qualified majority. 
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2.1  An ambitious and ambiguous actor: Visions and missions of the EU 
The list of aims and objectives of the Union’s external action is quite extensive and covers all 
areas of traditional (national) foreign policy. In this context, the Union presents itself as both an 
ambitious and an ambiguous actor.  
In the preamble of the Treaty on European Union, the Lisbon Treaty stresses the reference to the 
“cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the univer-
sal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, 
equality and the rule of law” and declares as the aim of the CFSP and the CSDP that they should 
be “reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security 
and progress in Europe and in the world.” 
The almost missionary statement of the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty, which had stated 
that “Europe offers them [the peoples] the best chance of pursuing, with due regard for the 
rights of each individual and in awareness of their responsibilities towards future generations 
and the Earth, the great venture which makes of it a special area of human hope”, has not been 
reproduced in the preamble of the reformed TEU. Instead, the preamble in the Lisbon TEU is 
the same as in the present TEU except for one new paragraph about the “cultural, religious and 
humanist inheritance of Europe”.  
Box 1. Visions and missions of the Union’s external action 
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and 
contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable devel-
opment of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of 
poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict 
observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter. 
Source: Art. 3 (5) TEU. 
The Lisbon Treaty contains an extended catalogue of common values and ambitious normative 
aims which characterise the EU internally and which it seeks to promote externally. This cata-
logue stresses the impression of a self-perception as a ‘civilian’ (Blauberger, 2005; Whitman, 
1998; Bull, 1982; Duchêne, 1972) or ‘normative’ power (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007; Manners, 
2006, 2002), while at the same time Art. 42 (1) TEU claims that the Common Security and De-
fence Policy shall “provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and mili-
tary assets.” 
Box 2. General provisions on the ‘Union’s external action’ 
(1) The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired 
its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: de-
mocracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter and international law. 
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, 
regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall 
promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Na-
tions. 
(2) The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree 
of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: 
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; 8 | WESSELS & BOPP 
 
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international 
law; 
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the pur-
poses and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and 
with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders; 
(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, 
with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; 
(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progres-
sive abolition of restrictions on international trade; 
(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the 
sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; 
(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and  
(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global gov-
ernance. 
Source: Art. 21 TEU. 
The aims and objectives of Art. 21 TEU draw from different articles of the Nice Treaty (11 (1), 
131, 177 and 181a TEU), combining them in one single article right at the beginning of the TEU 
and the chapter about the Union’s external action. A new aim of the Union’s ‘relations with the 
wider world’ is the ‘protection of its citizens’ (Art. 3 (5) TEU), a term that was introduced at the 
request of the French President Sarkozy. In the context of the Union’s external relations, this 
could refer to consular protection in third countries, protection from natural/man-made disasters 
or from terrorist threats, but the French position referred mainly to (social-economic) threats of 
globalisation (cf. European Policy Centre, 2007a: 39). 
The emphasis of the norms and values inherent in the European construction are thus presented 
as possible ‘exports’ which shall be promoted internationally. The EU identifies itself not only 
as an economic community but also as a ‘civilian power’, which could contribute to the norma-
tive ‘Europeanisation’ (cf. Olsen, 2002) of the rest of the world. 
A similar self-perception can be found in the formulation of the aims and objectives of the Un-
ion’s external action (see Box 1). The tasks with which the Union seeks to promote these aims 
(the ‘Petersberg Tasks’
 12) are amended by the Lisbon Treaty, and include now a wide range of 
measures such as”(…) civilian and military means, (…) joint disarmament operations, humani-
tarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-
conflict stabilisation” (Art. 43 (1) TEU). The fight against terrorism is also included (Art. 43 (1) 
TEU, 222 TFEU). The Petersberg Tasks originally only included humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management (Art. 17 (2) TEU (Nice); cf. 
Diedrichs, 2008; Jopp & Sandawi, 2007; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). This amendment exem-
plifies the hybrid nature of the Union’s identity: while typical civilian aims are pursued, the 
military capabilities for the implementation/enforcement of these are increased.  
The fight against terrorism concerns not only CFSP but also the Justice and Home Affairs sec-
tion where it is mentioned several times (Arts. 75, 83, 88 TFEU). It is not quite clear how this 
pillar-overarching topic will be coordinated and pursued.  
                                                      
12 The Petersberg Tasks were first set out in the “Petersberg Declaration” adopted at the Ministerial 
Council of the Western European Union (WEU) in June 1992 and were afterwards included in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam (former Art. 17 TEU).  THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF CFSP AFTER THE LISBON TREATY | 9 
 
Regarding the defence policy the Lisbon Treaty keeps the formulations that were introduced by 
the Maastricht Treaty and which set as an aim the “progressive framing of a common defence 
policy, which might lead to a common defence” (Preamble and similar Art. 24 (1) TEU; Art. 2 
(4) TFEU). Article 42 (2) TEU has a similar wording, but is more precise: “The common secu-
rity and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence pol-
icy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council (…) so decides.”  
In a newly added ‘Solidarity Clause’ (Art. 222 TFEU), member states commit themselves to 
mutual solidarity in cases of terrorist attacks or natural or man-made disasters. A similar com-
mitment to mutual assistance even in the case of an armed aggression on the territory of one of 
the member states can be found in Art. 42 (7) TEU in the framework of the CSDP articles.  
Box 3. Solidarity clause 
(1) The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the 
object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all 
the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, 
to: 
(a) — prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; 
     — protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; 
     — assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a 
terrorist attack; 
(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natu-
ral or man-made disaster. 
(2) Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or manmade dis-
aster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the 
Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council. 
(…) 
Source: Art. 222 TFEU. 
This clause and especially Art. 42 (7) TEU are very similar to the collective security article (Art. 
5) of the NATO Treaty which provides for mutual cooperation in the case of an armed attack on 
one of the member states: 
Box 4. Art. 42 (7) TEU vs. Art. 5 NATO Treaty 
Article 42 (7) TEU 
If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have 
towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Arti-
cle 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and 
defence policy of certain Member States. 
Article 5 NATO Treaty 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall 
be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack oc-
curs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Arti-
cle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forth-
with, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. (…) 
Source: NATO Treaty and TEU. 10 | WESSELS & BOPP 
 
The major difference in these two articles is that in the case of an armed aggression, the NATO 
article foresees action “including the use of armed force”, which is not specified in the EU Soli-
darity Clause. But the fact that the use of armed force is also not excluded leads inevitably to the 
question if the EU in fact is becoming a defence organisation. In its resolution on the revision of 
the European Security Strategy (ESS) the EP writes that the EU “is on the way to developing 
into a Security and Defence Union”.
13 In the ESS, which is about to be revised in 2008, the Un-
ion also stresses the mutual solidarity of the Member States and repeats the aims of the EU to 
contribute to global security and building a better world (cf. Pullinger, 2007; Valasek, 2007).
14 
Nevertheless, the second paragraph of Art. 42 (7) TEU limits the mutual obligations of EU 
Member States by stressing that “Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent 
with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which 
are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its im-
plementation”. Thus, despite the rapid developments in the “living architecture” of CSDP since 
1999 it is generally assumed that “the EU as a security actor is still in its early infancy” 
(Howorth, 2007: 3). 
These formulations of norms and objectives of a ‘civilian’ power (Blauberger, 2005; Whitman, 
1998; Bull, 1982; Duchêne, 1972) are thus accompanied by an incremental cooperation in the 
military area and a step-by-step strengthening of the military (defence) capabilities of the EU 
(cf. Treacher, 2004). Whether and to what extent the Union will be able to use its military ca-
pacities to defend and promote its civilian objectives need to be discussed in the light of the 
provision for the respective instruments and institutions.  
2.2  Legal instruments and operative resources: Limited changes  
2.2.1  Overview: CFSP/CSDP as special category of competences 
In the articles regulating the division of competences between the Union and its member states, 
the Union’s competence in the area of CFSP and CSDP is mentioned in Art. 2 (4) TFEU – thus, 
neither within the area of exclusive competences (Art. 3 TEU) nor within the ‘shared’ (Art. 4 
TEU) nor ‘supporting’ competences (Art. 6 TFEU). In the respective provisions of the Constitu-
tional Treaty, CFSP was placed between the shared and supporting category of competences. 
This placement within the division of competences documents the special and unique role of 
this policy field. Other policy areas with clear foreign implications belong to the Union’s exclu-
sive competences (customs union, common commercial policy and the right to conclude certain 
international agreements) or shared competences (development cooperation and humanitarian 
aid). The categorisation of different areas of competences in general can be interpreted as a con-
tinuing ‘pillarisation’ within the treaties. The impression of continuing ‘pillars’ is also rein-
forced by an explicit statement that CFSP “is subject to specific rules and procedures” (Art. 24 
(1) TEU). In view of the allocation of competences, a new element has been inserted in the 
treaty stating that national security remains a national competence (Art. 4 (2) TEU), a phrase 
that was also not foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty.  
An additional declaration stresses that “competences not conferred upon the Union in the Trea-
ties will remain with the Member States” (Declaration No. 18). Further treaty revisions may not 
only increase but also reduce the Union’s competences.
15 A further point of reference for the 
member state’s anxiety not to lose too much power can be found in Declaration No. 24, which 
                                                      
13 European Parliament, 2006. 
14 European Council, 2003b; 2007a: 24. 
15 Declaration No. 18 in relation to the delimitation of competences. THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF CFSP AFTER THE LISBON TREATY | 11 
 
offers reassurances that Union’s “legal personality” will not authorise it to act beyond its com-
petences.  
Thus, despite the official granting of “legal personality” (Art. 47 TEU) to the Union, which ba-
sically allows the Union to conclude international agreements in all its areas of competence (cf. 
Art. 216 TFEU) and is generally seen as a very positive asset regarding the Union’s external ca-
pability to act, the special provisions for CFSP seem to draw a different picture.  
2.2.2  Instruments for implementation: Modest changes  
Compared with the ambitious claim of the aims and objectives (cf. section 2.1), the underlying 
legal instruments have been modified only modestly. Whereas the Constitutional Treaty had 
foreseen “European decisions” in CFSP/CSDP (as part of the general ‘re-naming’ of the Un-
ion’s instruments, cf. Art. I-33 and III-294 TCE), the Lisbon Treaty again refers only to “deci-
sions”. In any case, as before, the “adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded” (Art. 24 TEU). 
The instruments at hand for the Union in CFSP/CDSP refer to the adoption of general guide-
lines, decisions on positions, actions and their implementation and the strengthening of coopera-
tion between the Member States (cf. Box 5Box 5).  
Box 5. Legal instruments of CFSP 
The Union shall conduct the common foreign and security policy by: 
(a) defining the general guidelines; 
(b) adopting decisions defining: 
  (i) actions to be undertaken by the Union; 
  (ii) positions to be taken by the Union; 
  (iii) arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in points (i) and (ii); and by 
(c) strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy. 
Source: Art. 25 TEU. 
The instrument of a “common strategy” (Art. 12 TEU (Nice)) has been deleted but a similar 
term remains in the formulation of the tasks of the European Council who shall “identify the 
Union’s strategic interests” and “define the strategic lines of the Union’s policy” (Art. 26 
TEU).
16 The Nice Treaty had foreseen “joint actions” and “common positions”, a term deleted in 
the Lisbon Treaty.  
Decisions on “operational action” shall contain “objectives, scope, the means to be made avail-
able to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation“ (Art. 
28 TEU). Decisions on positions of the Union can refer “to a particular matter of geographical 
or thematic nature” (Art. 29 TEU). For the implementation of the CFSP, national as well as Un-
ion resources may be used (Art. 26 (3) TEU).  
To reach the aims of the Common Security and Defence Policy, the Union furthermore has the 
option of “missions” for which “civilian and military assets” may be used (Art. 42 (1)). The 
execution of such special tasks may also be entrusted to a certain group of member states “to 
protect the Union’s values and serve its interests” (Art. 42 (5) TEU). But the resources for these 
                                                      
16 As elaborated elsewhere, this instrument has only been used three times between 1999 and 2005, and 
has proved to be quite ineffective. It had been elaborated as a possible introduction to qualified majority 
decisions in the Council (cf. Regelsberger, 2007b: 76, 2001: 158-159; Wessels, 2003b).  12 | WESSELS & BOPP 
 
operations “having military or defence implications” remain at national level: “The performance 
of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States” (Art. 41 
(2); similar Art. 42 (1) TEU).  
As far as budgetary means are concerned, administrative and operating expenditure shall – as is 
already the case – be charged to the Union budget except for operations with military and de-
fence implications (Art. 41 (1) and (2) TEU). In cases where the expenditures are not charged to 
the Union budget, they have to be paid by the member states, taking into account their gross na-
tional product. The Council also has the option to decide otherwise. In this formulation, the Lis-
bon Treaty has added the requirement for an unanimous decision which had already been in the 
formulation of the Nice Treaty but which was not specified in the Constitutional Treaty (Art. 41 
(2) TEU and III-313 TCE/ 28 TEU (Nice)). The Lisbon Treaty also introduces a new element 
regarding the “rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initia-
tives” which refers especially to the civil and/or military operations and missions (Art. 41 (3) 
TEU). This “start-up fund” shall consist of member states’ contributions, the Council deciding 
(with qualified majority voting) on its set-up, administration and control and authorising the 
High Representative to use the fund if necessary. This shall be the case when the task that is 
planned cannot be charged to the Union budget (i.e. when it is an operation with military and 
defence implications). The European Parliament, which is normally fully participating in the 
budgetary procedure, shall only be consulted (Art. 41 (3) TEU).  
In contrast to this rather limited set of instruments for CFSP, other areas of external action are 
implemented via the whole range of instruments that is offered by the application of the ordi-
nary legislative procedure, i.e. regulations, directives and decisions (cf. Art. 289 TFEU). This 
refers for example to the common commercial policy, development cooperation or humanitarian 
aid. 
As in the previous treaties, the Lisbon Treaty stresses the mutual commitment of member states 
to support the Union’s external and security policy “actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loy-
alty and mutual solidarity” and to “refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of 
the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness” (Art. 24 (3) TEU), thus specifying the general 
assurance of mutual cooperation and fulfilment of treaty obligations (Art. 4 (3) TEU). Both the 
Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty added a subordinate clause with an obligation of 
the member states to “comply with the Union’s action in this area” (Art. 24 (3) TEU). They 
have also extended the regulations for mutual information and consultation (former Art. 16 TEU 
(Nice)) of the member states in matters of general interest (now Art. 32 TEU). Furthermore, the 
article stresses: “Member States shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the 
Union is able to assert its interests and values on the international scene.” Further regulations of 
mutual information mechanisms have not been changed in substance (cf. Art. 28 TEU).  
The Lisbon Treaty also repeats the formulations of the current Art. 19 TEU (Nice) regulating 
that the member states shall “coordinate their action in international organisations and at inter-
national conferences” (Art. 34 (1) TEU). A new phrase regarding the responsibility of the High 
Representative for the organisation of this coordination has been added, as well as a provision 
stating that the member states that are members of the UN Security Council “will concert and 
keep the other Member States as well as the High Representative fully informed” (Art. 34 (2) 
TEU) – in the Nice Treaty only the other member states had to be informed. This task of the 
High Representative strengthens his/her role for the external representation and coherence of the 
Union.  
To control this mutual loyalty, the Lisbon Treaty addresses the Council and the High Represen-
tative to “ensure compliance with these principles [of mutual political solidarity]” (Art. 24 (3) 
TEU), a task that was formerly assigned only to the Council (Art. 11 (2) TEU (Nice)). In any 
case, the compliance with this demand for mutual solidarity and loyalty has to be tested in the THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF CFSP AFTER THE LISBON TREATY | 13 
 
future. During the Iraq war in 2003, similar provisions in the Treaty of Nice (Art. 11 EUV 
(Nice)) turned out to be rather ‘dead treaty letters’. 
In this regard the High Representative will play a role that is not yet clearly defined. S/he could 
behave as an actor representing the overall interests of the Union and controlling national for-
eign policies without any ties to national institutions – similar to the task of the Commission to 
“promote the general interest of the Union” [and] “ensure the application of the Treaties” (Art. 
17 (1) TEU). That s/he “shall ensure the implementation of the decisions adopted by the Euro-
pean Council and the Council” (Art. 27 (1) TEU) is another indicator for the ‘watchdog’ func-
tion of the High Representative. But contrary to the competence of the Commission in other 
policy fields (cf. Art. 258 TFEU), the High Representative may not bring a matter of non-
compliance of treaty obligations by a member state before the Court of Justice. In the terms of a 
“principal-agent” (cf. Pollack, 2006; Kassim & Menon, 2003) relationship, the High Represen-
tative could thus also function as an agent of the European Council and its president, controlling 
both the Commission and the EP. The reading of the legal text suggests that the High Represen-
tative could also play the role of a ‘moral conscience’ in trying to maintain discipline among the 
member states through ‘naming, shaming and blaming’ of rule-breaching governments (for the 
terms used in context with the Open Method of Coordination, see Linsenmann et al., 2007; 
Meyer, 2004) and to make the mutual commitments ‘credible’ (Moravcsik, 1998). But the 
analysis of the living diplomatic practice so far does not seem to confirm this expectation.  
It remains open which actor or interest constellation could guarantee that the member states 
comply with the norms of behaviour that they set for themselves. As could be seen in various 
cases in the history of the EPC/CFSP (see case studies in Regelsberger et al., 1997; Pijpers et 
al., 1989), governments tend to bypass these soft commitments if it seems conducive to their 
own national interests (at least in the short run). In such a dilemma the cost-benefit calculations 
of rational acting states tends towards non-compliance. Even if these declarations have clearly 
defined formulations, the states can avoid the inherent obligations without facing any sanctions. 
Member states could also become free-riders who take advantage of the solidarity behaviour of 
others without having to comply with the rules that might be against their own short-term inter-
ests (see in general Hasenclever et al., 1997; Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1983: 2; Wessels, 2000). 
Therefore it cannot be expected that the new and old regulations will establish a regime of co-
operation within which the member states – orchestrated by the High Representative – will 
transform the treaty principles into common norms of behaviour in the living architecture.  
On the other hand, authors have identified growing trends of ‘Brusselisation’ (see Regelsberger, 
2007a; Wessels & Regelsberger, 2005: 105f.), especially at the administrative level of CFSP-
related bodies such as working and expert groups. The increasing number of bodies working 
within CFSP and especially CSDP in Brussels might contribute to bringing life into these letters 
by establishing and living a common group discipline. Based on these treaty formulations, ac-
tors in Brussels – though without ‘teeth’ – might construct appropriate norms (see for the term 
March & Olsen, 1989; for an overview, see Risse, 2004; Hall & Taylor, 1996) for the work 
within the legal architecture (Wessels & Regelsberger, 2005: 106). This goes along with a 
growing ‘socialisation’ of CFSP actors, leading to specific patterns of behaviour (Juncos & Po-
morska, 2006). 
Based on previous experiences, it can be expected that especially crises in issues that are re-
garded as ‘high politics’ (Hoffmann, 1966) will lead to a behaviour that is focused on a coun-
try’s own national interest. The formula “The Member States shall show mutual solidarity” (Art. 
32 TEU) will probably not lead to a realignment of national foreign policy in constellations of 
divergent preferences.   
In this respect the Lisbon Treaty thus basically repeats the formulations of the Constitutional 
Treaty. Amendments to the existing Treaty of Nice are of minor relevance and do not seem to 14 | WESSELS & BOPP 
 
provoke a stimulus for major changes in the behavioural pattern of member states. Thus the risk 
remains that this formula about the “appropriate behaviour” of the Lisbon Treaty will remain 
‘treaty prose’ without any significant impact on the day-to-day practice.  
2.3  Institutions and procedures – major innovations with unforeseeable 
roles 
2.3.1  A survey on the institutional balance 
The institutional architecture of CFSP has been subject to major innovations and amendments, 
although some basic underlying features remain. This new architecture deserves to be paid spe-
cial attention by the new full-time president of the European Council (Art. 15 TEU) and the of-
fice of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Art. 18 
TEU).  
Figure 3. The institutional architecture of CFSP 
 
Source: Wessels, 2008: 412. 
If we take a closer look at the modifications to the institutional balance (see Figure 4), we see 
that the role of the European Parliament in CFSP matters has not been substantially modified. 
The Lisbon Treaty inserted the High Representative as the new contact partner of the EP (in-
stead of the Commission or the Council Chairman) who shall regularly inform it and to whom it 
can address questions and recommendations (Art. 36 TEU). Furthermore, the frequency of de-
bates within the EP on CFSP and CSDP matters has been upgraded to twice instead of once per 
year. As a minor amendment the Lisbon Treaty added that the EP should also be regularly con-
sulted on aspects of the CFSP (Art. 36 TEU) and not only in CFSP issues. But as administrative 
and operating expenditures of CFSP are charged to the Union budget – except for matters hav-
ing military or defence implications (Art. 41 TEU) – the EP has at least some kind of influence 
via the budgetary procedure. 
The “Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union” furthermore foresees 
that a “conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs” may organise interparlia-
mentary conferences “in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security policy, in-
cluding common security and defence policy” (Art. 10 of the Protocol).  
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These treaty provisions document the marginal role of the EP which remains restricted to acting 
as a forum in this policy field. It also fosters the special characteristics of this policy field which 
generally requires fast, discreet and discretionary decisions. Similarly restricted is often the role 
of national parliaments in national foreign policy (Diedrichs, 2004; Mittag, 2003: 153). At the 
same time the preference for an ‘intergovernmental’ character of the CFSP has again been 
stressed: The Lisbon Treaty does not see the EP as a source of legitimacy for this central part of 
coordinating national action. Governments and diplomats remain the only legitimised actors 
who have to resort to their national basis for acceptance of their activities.   
It is especially important that the overall dominance of the European Council in this policy field 
has not been modified. This body shall “identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the 
objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, includ-
ing matters with defence implications” (Art. 26 TEU). Its task description is even reinforced if 
compared to the Nice Treaty (Art. 13 TEU (Nice)).  
In political practice, several tasks can be attributed to the European Council. These are the pro-
vision of guidelines and overall guidance, to give orientation and to ‘steer’ the EU, to act itself 
as an international actor and to act as a decision-taking body. Furthermore, its meetings attract 
in general more attention in the media than the meetings of other EU institutions which provides 
it with a special impact on publicity and questions of legitimacy (Wessels, 2008). Especially the 
function as an institutional actor on its own in the international system is of relevance as it even 
increases the number of actors representing the Union externally. Since its beginnings, the 
European Council and its rotating presidency have interpreted their role as representation and 
‘voice’ of the Union and have regularly adopted declarations on all major international devel-
opments. Even if these declarations often refer to merely compromising statements that can be 
interpreted in various different ways, the European Council remains a central institution for ori-
entation and reference.  
As the previous paragraphs might have shown already, the institutional architecture of CFSP is 
quite complicated and very much simplified by the graphical presentation above. Thus, the fol-
lowing Figure 4 aims at demonstrating the complexity of the institutional architecture – this 
time at the cost of clarity. 
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The Lisbon Treaty divides the former General Affairs and External Relations Council into two 
separate bodies: the General Affairs Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (Art. 16 (6) TEU). 
This overdue division reflects the growing number and complexity of CFSP issues the Council 
has to deal with. But this division of labour also holds some open risks: as the General Affairs 
Council shall prepare the meetings of the European Council together with its president and with 
the Commission (Art. 16 (6) TEU), it is also involved in foreign affairs insofar as they are on 
the agenda of the sessions of this major decision-maker. Also, the continuity represented by the 
full-time President of the European Council contrasts with the rotating presidency in the Gen-
eral Affairs Council. The Foreign Affairs Council will be the only Council formation with a 
fixed chairperson (the High Representative) for five years besides the European Council with its 
full-time President for 2.5 years.  
The tasks of the Council are reconfirmed with minor changes of terminology when compared to 
the current Nice Treaty. The Council shall “frame” the CFSP and “take the decisions necessary 
for defining and implementing it” (Art. 26 (2) TEU).
17 Furthermore, the Council takes decisions 
on operational action by the Union “where the international situation requires” (Art. 28 (1) 
TEU), thus binding the member states who “shall commit” to these decisions “in the positions 
they adopt and in the conduct of their activity” (Art. 28 (2) TEU).  
The work description of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as part of the institutional 
structure of the Council (Art. 38 TEU) has basically remained unchanged except that it shall act 
not only at the request of the Council but also of the High Representative and that it shall work 
under the responsibility of both institutions. The PSC shall also assist the Council in the imple-
mentation of the Solidarity Clause (Art. 222 TFEU) and here, if necessary, cooperate with the 
new Standing Committee for Justice and Home Affairs (Art. 71 TFEU). The tasks designed to it 
overlap partially with the tasks of the High Representative – an ambiguity in the text that leaves 
much room for interpretation (see below). Similarly, the division of competences between the 
PSC and Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER, Art. 16 (7) TEU) is not clearly 
defined, which might lead to concurring tensions between these two institutions preparing ses-
sions of the Council.  
The Commission in its role as contact person for the EP and as a player within the CFSP has 
been replaced by the High Representative who establishes a not yet clearly defined connection 
to the Commission due to its role as its Vice President. The basic division of action is mani-
fested in Art. 22 (2) TEU which states that “The High Representative (…), for the area of com-
mon foreign and security policy, and the Commission, for other areas of external action, may 
submit joint proposals to the Council” (see also Art. 17 (1) TEU). The role of the Commission 
has thus been weakened in CFSP in favour of the High Representative although it remains to be 
seen what role the latter will fulfil as a Vice President of the Commission and which environ-
ment – the group of Commissioners or the colleagues of the Foreign Ministries – will socialise 
him/her more severely (see below).   
As before, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has no jurisdiction in CFSP and 
CSDP matters (Art. 24 (1) TEU and 275 TFEU). However, there are some exceptions. This re-
fers to the monitoring of compliance with Art. 40 TEU, which assures that implementation of 
CFSP shall not affect the procedures and powers of the institution as laid down in the TEU and 
the TFEU, mainly in the articles containing the division of competences (Art. 3-6 TFEU). Fur-
thermore, the Court may rule on proceedings initiated by natural or legal persons against acts of 
                                                      
17 Here as elsewhere the Reform Treaty merges regulations into one article, which were separated in the 
Constitutional Treaty between part I and part III (in this case, being Art. I-40 (2) and III-295 (2) TCE) and 
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the Union reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures adopted on the 
basis of the CFSP/CSDP provisions.  
Notably, the exclusion of the Court from this policy field has been slightly extended when com-
pared to the Constitutional Treaty. In the TCE, the jurisdiction of the Court was not excluded 
from the provisions having general applications (Title V Chapter I, Art. III-292 and III-293 
TCE, cf. Art. III-376 TCE), whereas in the Lisbon Treaty the jurisdiction of the ECJ relates to 
all provisions of the whole title except for the above-mentioned exclusions, which were also ex-
cluded in the TCE. In the next subsections, we will analyse the two major institutional innova-
tions in more detail. 
2.3.2  The President of the European Council: More than chairperson and 
spokesperson 
Of major importance is the potential role of the full time President of the European Council as a 
major decision-making body – not only in the legal but especially in the living architecture.  
The ‘full-time’ President of the European Council is elected by qualified majority for 2½ years 
(renewable once). As this election is foreseen without proposal of the Commission or the High 
Representative, the requirements for qualified majority are slightly higher than usual (from No-
vember 2014 on, requiring 72% of the members in the European Council, representing at least 
65% of the population (Art. 238 TFEU), making an agreement quite difficult. The main tasks of 
this institution are set out in Box 6. 
Box 6. Tasks of the President of the European Council 
The President of the European Council: 
(a) shall chair it and drive forward its work; 
(b) shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with 
the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council; 
(c) shall endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council;  
(d) shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Coun-
cil. 
The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external repre-
sentation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice 
to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
The President of the European Council shall not hold a national office. 
Source: Art. 15 (6) TEU. 
His tasks and functions are not very clear especially when compared to the catalogue of tasks 
assigned to the High Representative. On the one side, s/he has to be able to promote consensus 
among the heads of state and government and on the other side s/he has to be influential enough 
to ‘steer’ the Union and ensure member states’ implementation of their political promises. This 
position thus moves between two extreme positions: one the one hand, a merely coordinating 
chairperson with representative functions, and on the other, a kind of strong ‘President of 
Europe’ or ‘Mr/Ms Europe’, seen to represent the Union in its role in the international system 
(cf. CEPS et al., 2007; Wessels & Hofmann, 2008). 
The potential role conflicts between the President of the European Council and the High Repre-
sentative, which are indicated by this article, are obvious. The formulation “without prejudice 
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their resolution shifted to daily practice. It is not clear to what extent the Union’s external repre-
sentation will be ‘shared’ between these two institutions in everyday practice – it seems that in 
the future the EU might then have at least ‘two telephone numbers’. Should the President of the 
European Council combine his/her internal management tasks with his task of “external repre-
sentation of the Union” (e.g. dialogues with presidents and heads of government of third coun-
tries), s/he will become an important actor within the CFSP. In the light of the above-mentioned 
self-perception of the European Council as actor on its own and representative of the EU, the 
full-time President could be regarded as the main ‘spokesperson’ of the EU in all matters of in-
ternational interest.  
Furthermore, even if the presidency of the European Council brings more coherence to the Un-
ion’s external action, the President still has to cope with the rotating Council presidency in the 
other-than-Foreign Affairs Councils and in the committees and working groups that are subor-
dinated to the Foreign Affairs Council (see above). In this function the office might also com-
pete with the reinforced President of the Commission, who is well disposed to “ensure the 
preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council” (Art. 15 (6) TEU) together 
with the President of the European Council. 
Finally, the President has to prepare a report for the European Parliament after each European 
Council meeting, although in general it is the task of the High Representative to keep the EP in-
formed about developments in CFSP (Art. 36 TEU).  
2.3.3  The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy  
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Art. 18 TEU) is 
– together with the full-time presidency of the European Council – the central new institutional 
arrangement in the area of CFSP within the new treaty. The office is the latest of a range of sug-
gestions and efforts to enhance the efficiency of the cooperation between the member states and 
to “ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action” (Art. 18 (4) TEU) in giving it a ‘sin-
gle voice’ and ‘face’. To fulfil these tasks the person will be provided with a ‘double hat’ or 
even three functions, respectively. The office combines the current two posts of the High Repre-
sentative Javier Solana and the Commissioner for external action (currently Benita Ferrero-
Waldner). Furthermore, as a ‘third hat’ he or she will chair the Foreign Affairs Council. 
Figure 4. The functions of the High Representative: A magic triangle or a tragic melange? 
External 
representation
Vice-President & 
Commissioner for ext. 
relations of the Commission
Chairperson Foreign 
Affairs Council
High 
Represen-
tative
KOM COM Council
External 
representation
Vice-President & 
Commissioner for ext. 
relations of the Commission
Chairperson Foreign 
Affairs Council
High 
Represen-
tative
KOM COM KOM COM Council Council
 
Source: Wessels, 2003b. 20 | WESSELS & BOPP 
 
Due to the extensive concentration of tasks, the election and competences deserve a more de-
tailed analysis. The dual assignment of the High Representative is also visible in the way of 
his/her selection and/or dismissal: “The European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with 
the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” (Art. 18 (1) TEU). The same applies for the end 
of the term of office. Keeping in mind the requirements for qualified majority voting, some pos-
sible member state coalitions can be detected for the appointment of the High Representative.
18 
Examples for meeting the criteria required until 2014 would be the 23 ‘smaller’
19 member states 
and Germany, all ‘pro-integration’
20 states or all NATO members. Coalitions meeting the crite-
ria from 1 November 2017 onwards would be the 23 ‘smaller’ member states and two of the big 
states
21 or the above-mentioned ‘pro-integration’ coalition or the NATO members. A blocking 
minority must be comprised of at least four member states. The voting requirements for his/her 
election are thus quite high. What might become relevant is the option of a NATO members’ 
coalition, depending on the profile of a controversial candidate. This could lead to the situation 
in which the EU member states that are also NATO members could agree on a candidate for the 
High Representative and thus outvote the neutral EU member states. An additional declaration 
reminds us that in the choice of the persons for the offices of the High Representative, the Presi-
dent of the European Council and the President of the Commission “due account is to be taken 
of the need to respect the geographical and demographic diversity of the Union and its Member 
States”.
22 
Apart from his appointment, the High Representative is – as part of the Commission – also re-
sponsible to the European Parliament insofar as the EP has to give a vote of consent to the entire 
Commission (Art. 17 (7) TEU). In a similar way, the High Representative has to pay attention to 
the role of the President of the Commission who can request his withdrawal – in contrast to the 
current treaty the President of the Commission no longer even needs the “approval of the Col-
lege [of Commissioners]” for this step (new Art. 17 (6) TEU and former Art. 217 (4) TEC 
(Nice)). Thus the High Representative is responsible to three bodies at the same time – the 
Commission, the Council and (to a lesser extent) to the EP – which will represent a difficult bal-
ancing act, leading analysts to the conclusion that the High Representative wears not only “two 
resp. three hats” but also has “to carry a raincoat and umbrella” (CEPS et al., 2007). and that the 
person fulfilling these tasks needs the characteristics of a “superhuman gymnast” (European 
Policy Centre, 2007a). A fourth institutional involvement relates to the participation of the High 
Representative in the meetings of the European Council. His success in granting more coher-
ency and effectiveness in the Union’s external action will rely heavily on his ability to combine 
his (at least) two faces, a reminder of the Roman god Janus having two faces, but each looking 
in a different direction. 
The job profile of the High Representative covers many central and differentiated functions 
which will probably absorb all of his/her attention. These are set out in detail below.  
First of all, s/he “conduct[s] the Union’s common foreign and security policy” (Art. 18 (2) 
TEU). That means that this person has a major influence to shape the agenda and its priorities, 
as well as to structure the debate and broker a consensus. Thus this office raises high expecta-
tions relating to his/her ability to drive forward the CFSP and CSDP via proposals, suggestions 
                                                      
18 See Art. 238 TFEU and the Protocol on transitional provisions.
  
19 All 27 except G, UK, F, ES. 
20 All 27 except UK, S, DK, CZ, SK, M. (see Wessels, 2001: 208). 
21 Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy. 
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and activities. At the same time the High Representative as chairperson of the Foreign Affairs 
Council has to promote consensus among its members while including different political inter-
ests of the member states as well as different resorts of the Commission and the respective net-
works behind. 
He shares the right to make proposals with the member states (Art. 30 (1) and 42 (4) TEU), a 
task he can also fulfil “with the Commission’s support” in matters of CFSP (Art. 30 (1) TEU). 
Different to the Commission in major policy fields of the TFEU, he has no monopoly of initia-
tive.  
The High Representative shall ensure the implementation of the decisions taken in the field of 
CFSP (Art. 27 (1) TEU). In this regard another overlapping of competences exists, this time 
with the Political and Security Committee, which shall “monitor the implementation of agreed 
policies, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative” (Art. 38 TEU). This un-
clear division of competences could be partly outweighed due to the fact that it is planned to ap-
point a representative of the High Representative as chairperson of the PSC.
23  
Within the CFSP the High Representative furthermore “represents the Union” and he “shall 
conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s 
position in international organisations and at international conferences” (Art. 27 (2) TEU), in-
cluding the right to represent the Union’s position on a specific topic in the UN Security Coun-
cil (see above and Art. 34 TEU).  
Finally, s/he shall contribute to the improvement of the coherence of the external representation. 
In this regard an important innovation which was introduced in the Constitutional Treaty and 
has remained in the Lisbon Treaty is the aspect that the High Representative may represent the 
Union’s position in the Security Council given that the Union has defined a position on one of 
the topics on the agenda and that he is requested to do so by the member states represented in 
the Security Council (Art. 34 (2) TEU). Furthermore, if a common approach of the Union has 
been defined by the Council or the European Council, the “High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States 
shall coordinate their activities within the Council” (Art. 32 TEU). The former is also responsi-
ble for the organisation of the coordination of the action of the member states in international 
organisations and at international conferences (Art. 34 (1) TEU, see above). These tasks stress 
his importance for the coherence of the Union’s external action and presence.  
In CDSP the High Representative shares the right of proposal with the member states, as in 
CFSP (Art. 42 (4) and 30 (1) TEU). He shall furthermore “ensure coordination of the civilian 
and military aspects” of the tasks foreseen within CSDP, meanwhile “acting under the authority 
of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee” 
(Art. 43 TEU). Nonetheless, the latter keeps its overall responsibility to “exercise, under the re-
sponsibility of the Council and the High Representative, the political control and strategic direc-
tion of the crisis management operations” (Art. 38 TEU). This Committee may even be author-
ised to take decisions “for the purpose and for the duration of a crisis management operation” 
(Art. 38 TEU).  
Further general coordination tasks of the High Representative are linked to forms of flexible co-
operation such as the establishment of a group of member states which can be entrusted by the 
Council with the fulfilment of a special task (Art. 42 TEU, see below) – here, the High Repre-
sentative shall “ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks” (Art. 43 
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(2) TEU) – and the “permanent structured cooperation” (Art. 46 TEU, see below), where s/he is 
closely involved.   
Additionally, the High Representative can convene an extraordinary Council meeting in “cases 
requiring a rapid decision” (Art. 30 (2) TEU).  Following a “specific request (…) from the 
European Council”, the High Representative may also propose decision-taking with QMV in the 
Council (Art. 31 (2) TEU, see also the following chapter on decision-making procedures). The 
High Representative may finally propose to the Council the appointment of so-called “special 
representatives” who then “shall carry out his or her mandate under the authority of the High 
Representative” (Art. 18 TEU). These special representatives are appointed by the Council with 
qualified majority. For the EP the High Representative has become the main contact person in 
CFSP issues (see above and Art. 36 TEU).  
The High Representative is also involved in the other (EC-) areas of external action where he 
has together with the Commission the right to make a joint proposal on the interruption of eco-
nomic/financial relations with third countries (Art. 215 TFEU) and can make recommendations 
to the Council on the conclusion of international agreements “where the agreement envisaged 
relates exclusively or principally to the common foreign and security policy” (Art. 218 TFEU). 
In reality, this might not always be easy to define. Furthermore, s/he will be responsible for the 
implementation of cooperation with other international organisations such as the UN and the 
Council of Europe (Art. 220 TFEU) and for the implementation of the solidarity clause (Art. 
222 TFEU). 
In addition to these tasks the High Representative also fulfils a special role within the Commis-
sion as one of its Vice-Presidents. The High Representative is “responsible (…) for responsibili-
ties incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s ex-
ternal action.” While fulfilling these tasks, he is “bound by the Commission procedures” (Art. 
18 (4) TEU). A new particularity which will not make his/her job easier is the fact that as Vice 
President s/he will be responsible for the coordination of external policies within the Commis-
sion and thus have a kind of ‘authority’ over the his colleagues dealing with policy fields with 
external implications. This might create tensions towards the president and within the consor-
tium of colleagues of Commissioners (Cf. European Policy Centre, 2007a: 19).  
Facing this job profile the High Representative has only limited own resources compared to 
his/her colleagues in the Council and in the Commission and is basically dependent on his 
power of persuasion within both institutions. For the fulfilment of his tasks he will be supported 
by a new body, the “European External Action Service” (EEAS), in the broadest sense a kind of 
‘foreign policy ministry’ (see also Chapter 2.5 below). Due to its mixed composition this insti-
tution  will not have the same hierarchical relation to the High Representative as would be ex-
pected from national officials to their Foreign Minister. Substantial operative resources such as 
financial aid remain within the Commission – a political weight the High Representative could 
or should use for his position within the Council. Furthermore s/he cannot expect to be sup-
ported by his national “colleagues” in his/her aim at promoting the capacity of the Union to act 
in the international system (see above). Thus the fulfilment of his/her tasks within the institu-
tional architecture will very much depend on his/her capability to move and act within and in 
between the different ‘hats’.  
A possible advantage lies within the multiple roles of the High Representative which could con-
tribute to giving him advanced information from  the one or the other forum. On the other hand 
his multiple roles could cause dependency on the goodwill of other actors who will probably 
‘test’ him/her in a first experimental phase if and how s/he considers their interests and rights.  
In order to be able to establish general acceptance and consensus in spite of this institutional and 
procedural pressure, the High Representative will probably have to pursuit a “low profile” pol-THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF CFSP AFTER THE LISBON TREATY | 23 
 
icy especially in times of crisis or conflict when the involved actors and institutions have di-
verging interests. His balancing between double or even triple ‘hats’ (see graph above) always 
holds the risk of falling between two or more chairs. This seems to indicate that his position can 
only marginally enhance efficiency within and external effectiveness in situations of global cri-
sis such as the Iraq war.  
2.3.4 Decision-Making  Procedures 
The re-designed institutional (im-)balance is further influenced by the rules governing the in-
volvement of the different institutions in the daily decision-making procedures (cf. Figure 6).  
Neither the Constitutional Treaty nor the Lisbon Treaty reached a breakthrough in the question 
of decision-making procedures in CFSP: unanimity remains the standard for decision-making in 
this policy field (Art. 24 (1), 31 (1) TEU). Box 7 lists the exceptions and thus decisions to be 
taken with qualified majority. 
Box 7. Qualified Majority Voting in CFSP 
(2) By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:  
— when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the Euro-
pean Council relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article 22(1), 
— when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific re-
quest from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative, 
— when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position, 
— when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 33. 
If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to 
oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken.  The 
High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution 
acceptable to it. 3 If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that 
the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity. 
Source: Art. 31 (2) TEU. 
The second point is especially new and it could lead to rather perverse practice: if the High Rep-
resentative wants to start an initiative for more qualified majority voting in the Council, s/he has 
to refer first to the European Council and cannot bring the issue to the Council of Ministers di-
rectly.  
Furthermore subject to qualified majority voting and a new provision in the Treaty is a decision 
of the Council on the procedures for the setting-up of a ‘start-up fund’ which shall allow for 
rapid access to the Union budget in cases of “urgent financing of initiatives” (Art. 41 (3) TEU). 
Furthermore, the Council decides with QM the establishment of “permanent structured coopera-
tion” (Art. 46 (2) TEU, see below). A simple majority is needed for procedural questions (Art. 
31 (5) TEU), as it is formulated in the Nice Treaty.  
The Lisbon Treaty also maintains the possibility of constructive abstention: member states can 
abstain from a vote and qualify this with a formal declaration. This member state is then not 
obliged to application of the relevant decision which has to be respected by the other member 
states. Should the relevant decision have financial implications the member state is also ex-
empted from financial contributions. In case the number of member states abstaining rises to at 
least one third of the member states which represent at least one third of the population, the en-24 | WESSELS & BOPP 
 
tire decision is not adopted (Art. 31 (1)). In the Nice Treaty the threshold is one third of the 
weighted votes in the Council (Art. 23 TEU (Nice)).  
As a last option for protection of national interests, member states may – in cases where quali-
fied majority is applied – use an ‘emergency brake’ if the issue touches “vital and stated reasons 
of national policy” (Art. 31 (2) TEU, which follows the idea of the “Luxembourg Compromise”. 
While this latter agreement still required “very important interests” to be concerned, in the Nice 
Treaty it was changed to “important” (Art. 23 (2) TEU (Nice)) and in the Lisbon Treaty to “vi-
tal”). In these cases, the vote will be suspended and – another Treaty innovation – the High Rep-
resentative has the task to act as a kind of “mediator” in order to find a solution. He shall “in 
close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it” (Art. 
31 (2) TEU). If s/he fails the Council can by a qualified majority decision bring the issue to the 
European Council as arbitrator or “final instance” (cf. de Schoutheete, 2006). The European 
Council has (in)voluntarily more and more assumed this role as final decision-making body.  
The described ambiguities between consensus, qualified majority and national ‘emergency 
brakes’ document more than other provisions that the member states – when faced with the di-
lemma between efficiency of their body and the right to veto – have decided to guard their sov-
ereignty. For the High Representative this clearly limits his/her scope of action.  
A new aspect is that this list of exceptions from the unanimity rule can be extended by an 
unanimous decision of the European Council (passarelle clause, Art. 31 (3)). It is interesting to 
note that this provision is not subject to control by national parliaments – in contrast to the pro-
visions of the “general” passarelle clause of Art. 48 (7) TEU. In any case, this option for exten-
sion of QMV “shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications” (Art. 31 (4) 
TEU). 
Within CFSP and CSDP, special procedures will be applied concerning the question of data pro-
tection. Whereas Article 16 TFEU grants the general right to the protection of personal data and 
defines that the respective rules shall be adopted following the ordinary legislative procedure, 
this does not count for the area of CFSP where decisions of this kind are adopted by the Council 
only (Art. 39 TEU). The issue is further subject of a declaration in which requires that “when-
ever rules on protection of personal data (…) could have direct implications for national secu-
rity, due account will have to be taken on the specific characteristics of the matter.”
24  
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Figure 5. Decision-making in CFSP according to the Lisbon Treaty 
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2.4 Flexibility  options:  real  progress or wishful thinking? 
Debates about possible mechanisms of flexibilisation inside and outside the EU framework are 
recurrent in European integration history and date back to the 1970s. In the framework of CFSP 
they are of special relevance in light of the requirement for unanimity and the latest enlarge-
ments of the EU in May 2004 and January 2007 which increased the Union’s internal heteroge-
neity (for the discussion on flexibility within CFSP see also Tekin 2008). Key terms in this de-
bate are concepts of “avant-garde” (Chirac, 2000), “core Europe” (cf. Schäuble & Lamers, 
1994) or “centre of gravity” (Fischer, 2001).   
After the first introduction of flexibility options in the primary law with the Maastricht Treaty 
(for EMU and the Social Charter), the Amsterdam Treaty introduced the concept of “enhanced 
cooperation” (then still called “closer cooperation”), which was subsequently extended to the 
policy field of CFSP in the Nice Treaty (Art. 27a TEU (Nice)). However, this option has not 
been used in the “living architecture” so far neither in the EC nor in the CFSP pillar. The Lisbon 
Treaty now reconfirms the option of “enhanced cooperation” and extends its range of applica-
tion even to matters having military or defence implications, thus extending this flexibility op-
tion to CSDP (Diedrichs & Jopp, 2005, 2003; Jopp & Regelsberger, 2003). At the same time the 
requirements for such a flexible cooperation were reduced: the minimum number of member 
states which have to participate was changed from eight in the Nice Treaty to nine in the Lisbon 
Treaty (Art. 20 (2) TEU), meaning a reduction from half of the member states to one third in an 
enlarged Union of 27. But in light of the experiences so far the use of this flexibility option re-
mains doubtful.  
The relevant procedures are slightly different for CFSP than for other policy areas, especially in 
the fact that the request to establish enhanced cooperation has to be made to the Council instead 
of to the Commission and that the High Representative is responsible for assessing the consis-
tency with the other CFSP regulations while the Commission shall ensure consistency with the 
other policy areas of the Union. As the High Representative is part of the Commission and 
within it responsible for the coordination of all external relations aspects, the treaty provisions 
are not quite clear regarding the division of tasks between the High Representative and the rest 
of the Commission.  
Authorisation to proceed with the enhanced cooperation within CFSP is granted by an unani-
mous decision of the Council whereas in policy areas of the TFEU the Commission makes a 
proposal and the European Parliament has to give its consent and the Council decides with 
qualified majority (Art. 329 TFEU).  
The Lisbon Treaty furthermore establishes another, interesting new form of flexible cooperation 
for CSDP called “permanent structured cooperation” (Art. 42 (6), 46 TEU and the Protocol on 
permanent structured cooperation). It refers to member states “whose military capabilities fulfil 
higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area” 
(Art. 42 (6)). These member states would notify their intention to establish such a cooperation to 
the Council and the High Representative. Within three months, the Council has to decide with 
qualified majority on the establishment of the permanent structured cooperation. Within this 
form of cooperation, decisions are taken with unanimity within the Council. Participating mem-
ber states may also withdraw from the permanent structured cooperation and their participation 
may be suspended if they do not longer fulfil the necessary criteria (Art. 46 TEU).  
As a further option for flexibility the Council may entrust a group of member states with the 
“execution of a task (…) in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests” (Art. 42 
(5), 44 TEU, see also above). These “tasks” represent an existing political practice and are fur-
ther specified in Art. 43 TEU: they shall include “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian 
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tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict 
stabilisation” as well as combat of terrorism. The High Representative and the PSC have coor-
dination tasks and the Council decides on objectives, scope and general conditions of implemen-
tation (Art. 43 (2) TEU). Member states can also establish multinational forces and make these 
available to the CFSP (Art. 42 (3) TEU). Finally, as mentioned above, participation in the Euro-
pean Defence Agency is also voluntary but so far, all member states except Denmark, are par-
ticipating. The option of constructive abstention has already been analysed in Chapter 2.3.4 but 
should also be mentioned here due to the fact that this option also allows for flexible coopera-
tion for special groups of member states.  
Apart from these treaty-based options for flexibility it should be kept in mind that other forms of 
cooperation between some member states are already existent even without the explicit use of 
the relevant clauses in the Nice Treaty. In this sense the EU battle group concept (cf. Mölling, 
2007; Biscop, 2005; Quille, 2004) is a remarkable innovation. In the long run, these battle-
groups could lead to the establishment of a military CSDP-avantgarde of certain member states. 
Already at this stage many smaller member states declared their wish to participate in order not 
close the door for possible future permanent structured cooperation (Mölling, 2007). 
In general, these flexibility provisions for the area of CFSP foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty are 
more transparent both for participating and non-participating members so that the creation of a 
“directoire” of the big three (Hill, 2006) might be avoided. On the other hand the provisions for 
flexibility do not contain further incentives for these kinds of cooperation so that it remains to 
be seen if the member states will take the opportunity to use those forms of flexible cooperation 
within the Treaties or if they prefer to cooperate outside the Treaty. Whether these flexibility 
options are mere expression of a wishful thinking or could also function as a potential threat to 
not-willing member states cannot be assessed yet. 
2.5 Further  institutional  innovations: The European External Action Ser-
vice and the European Defence Agency 
A new institutional arrangement is the “European External Action Service” (EEAS) which shall 
assist the High Representative in “fulfilling his mandate” (Art. 27 (3) TEU) and thus function as 
a kind of “ministry” to the re-named “Foreign Minister”. The EEAS works in cooperation with 
the national diplomatic services and “shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the 
General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from na-
tional diplomatic services of the Member States” (Art. 27 (3) TEU) and thus combine suprana-
tional and intergovernmental elements (cf. Maurer/Reichel 2004). Its detailed organisation and 
functioning is still to be defined by a decision of the Council. An additional declaration regu-
lates that the Secretary-General of the Council, the High Representative, the Commission and 
the member states shall begin preparatory work on the EEAS after the signature of the Reform 
Treaty.
25 In fact, preparatory work had already begun in 2004 after the signature of the Constitu-
tional Treaty (Maurer/Reichel 2004) and the chapter was then re-opened during the 2007 treaty 
negotiations (European Policy Centre, 2007b).
26  
Nevertheless, the detailed set-up and tasks as well as the precise setting within the institutional 
architecture still remain unclear. So it remains to be seen if the Service will be placed within the 
Council or the Commission or none of them. Both institutions have differing concepts on how 
to structure this new body (Lieb & Maurer, 2007). Its legal status is also not defined yet: neither 
an agency such as the European Defence Agency nor a committee but rather a “hybrid new 
                                                      
25 Declaration No. 15 on Article 13a of the Treaty on European Union. 
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agency, indeed sui generis” (CEPS et al., 2007). Apart from the institutional question other as-
pects such as financing and professional support have to be answered, as well as the relations of 
the Service to the PSC, COREPER or the Special Representatives (Duke, 2004).  
Apart from these amendments in the institutional architecture, a new agency has been set up in 
the field of CSDP. The European Defence Agency was established by a Joint Action of the 
Council of Ministers in 2004 and has now been included in the articles of CSDP in the Lisbon 
Treaty. Following the treaty, it shall improve the military action capability of the Union (Art. 42 
(3) TEU). Irrespective of the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty the Agency was al-
ready established in 2004 by a Joint Action of the Council, acting on a request of the European 
Council of Thessaloniki in June 2003 who demanded the creation of “an intergovernmental 
agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments”.
27 
It was thus established even before the Constitutional Treaty was even signed. This demon-
strates that institutional changes within the CFSP are also pursued without the official procedure 
of treaty revisions and ratifications. Participation in the European Defence Agency is open to 
any member state. Furthermore “specific groups” can be set up within the Agency in order to 
pursue “joint projects” (Art. 45 TEU).  
At the end of 2007, all member states of the European Union except Denmark were participat-
ing in the Defence Agency.
28 Javier Solana, the current High Representative, is Head of the 
Agency and Chairman of the Steering Board, the latter being the decision-making board com-
posed of the 26 Ministers of Defence of the participating member states and a representative of 
the Commission. In the Joint Action of the Council, which established the EDA, it is said that 
the High Representative should have a “leading role in the Agency’s structure and provide the 
essential link between the Agency and the Council”.
29 The Agency operates under the “authority 
and the political supervision” of the Council.
30  
3. Assessments   
The previous chapters provided an overview over the distinctive provisions the Lisbon Treaty 
offers for EU-member state cooperation in the area of CFSP and CSDP. Our analysis reveals a 
rather mixed and “hybrid” character.  
Whereas we found many traces for norms and visions of a “civilian power” (Blauberger, 2005; 
Whitman, 1998; Bull, 1982; Duchêne, 1972), member states have made remarkable progress in 
giving the Union military and defence capabilities. Thus, the growing emphasis of the norms 
and values of a civilian power is accompanied by strengthened military capabilities and an in-
creased reference to defence issues. This is on the other hand only marginally represented in the 
constituting ideas (cf. Art. 42 (1) TEU), which leads to an ambiguous and far from coherent ex-
ternal picture of the EU’s international identity.  
Institutionally, the external coherence is somewhat strengthened. The Lisbon Treaty indeed 
made some efforts in order to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of single institutions, espe-
cially by the establishment of the High Representative and the full-time presidency of the Euro-
pean Council. But if this strengthening of single institutions will lead to more overall efficiency 
and coherence or, contrary, to mutual blocks, overlapping competences and inter-institutional 
tensions (cf. Wessels & Hofmann, 2008), cannot be answered at this stage. Thus, while the new 
                                                      
27 Council of the European Union 2004; European Council 2003a
. 
28 See Website of the Agency at http://www.eda.europa.eu (last visit: 29 November 2007). 
29 Council of the European Union 2004:17. 
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office of the High Representative could lead to a more coherent external action of the EU, the 
overlapping competences with the President of the European Council could also demote him/her 
to mere coordinative/administrative tasks. The treaty provisions for the institutional architecture 
remain quite vague and leave substantial room for interpretation in the “living architecture”. The 
High Representative has a position which is clearly placed in an area of conflict between and 
within the institutions. In the daily practice this person will probably be under tight scrutiny 
both of the national governments in the Council and the colleagues in the Commission as well 
as of the diplomats in the Political and Security Committee. He could also be ‘controlled’ by the 
president of the European Council as representative of the member states as the principals, if the 
latter interprets his own role in such a sense (cf. Art. 15 (6) and 27 (1) TEU). The “intrinsic du-
alism” (CEPS et al., 2007) which characterizes the external action of the European Union has 
not been dissolved but will be now continued and settled in one person.  
The Union’s capability to act might be increased by extended flexibility options and operative 
resources. But in the main intergovernmental pattern – the decision-making procedures – no 
breakthrough could be reached. The adoption of legal acts is still not possible for CFSP/CSDP 
and decisions have to be taken by unanimity. However, it is not clear if forms of flexible coop-
eration will be used in the living architecture or if they will serve mainly as a wishful thinking 
of member states. Overall, the modifications of the available instruments do not correspond to 
the enhanced list of objectives and aims, which indicates that the capabilities-expectations-gap 
(Hill, 1993, 1998) has rather been widened than closed. When analysed in light of the ambitious 
objectives of the Union to promote its internal norms and values in the international system the 
operative resources seem limited. The same applies for the legal instruments available for situa-
tions of crisis which per se would require rapid reaction. Thus the term Common Security and 
Defence Policy can still be regarded at somewhat misleading. 
The CFSP provisions of the Lisbon Treaty can thus not be qualified as a “saut constitutionnel” 
(Klein & Wessels, 2006) in a ‘supranational’ direction (cf. Wessels, 2005). Compared to other 
fields such as Justice and Home Affairs the Treaty of Lisbon does not offer substantial suprana-
tional leaps in the field of CFSP. Similarly, in the area of Security and Defence Policy the 
Treaty of Lisbon has not altered the dominance of the unanimity rule and the right to initiate 
proposals is shared between the High Representative and the member states. The Commission is 
only very marginally involved.  
In any case, in the living constitution and apart from the “official” treaty revisions cooperation 
in CSDP has already been strengthened – due to the establishment of the European Defence 
Agency, which is now (apart from the Space Agency) the only agency which is mentioned in 
the Lisbon Treaty, and the launch of the EU-battlegroups. Both issues had been realised in the 
“living architecture” and then been incorporated in the legal base of the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 42 
TEU and Protocol No. 10 on Permanent Structured Cooperation) and thus point at a very dy-
namic evolution and a kind of “hidden constitutionalisation” (Wessels & Regelsberger, 2005: 
93) and include forms of flexibility arrangements which lets us doubt about the feasibility of the 
new ‘official’ flexibility option for “permanent structured cooperation”.  
To sum up, we conclude that although major efforts have been made to strengthen efficiency 
and coherence – such as the establishment of the High Representative with its central inter-
institutional and mediating role – basic features of cooperation in this field remain not only in-
tergovernmental but even seem to indicate towards a further complication and confusion of re-
sponsibilities within the Union especially through unclear divisions of power not only between 
the High Representative and the ‘full-time’ President of the European Council but also between 
the PSC and the High Representative. Thus the hesitating pooling of national and supranational 
resources is on the one hand accompanied by ambitious aims and objectives stressing the Un-
ion’s claim to be a civilian power and an ever increasing refinement of intergovernmental 30 | WESSELS & BOPP 
 
strategies. At the same time, the increasing importance of defence issues has definitely changed 
the Union’s international identity, causing some authors to claim “an opportunity lost” 
(Treacher, 2004: 66) for the Union to become a distinct, non-military international actor.  
Thus, while we could find indicators for both of our contrasting assumptions, none of them has 
proven to be able to explain the whole range of developments. As a third possible explanation 
we find several traces for a ‘ratchet fusion’ (cf. Figure 1). In this perspective, national and 
European actors come together for joint activities and policy-making (labelled as ‘Europeanisa-
tion’ (Olsen, 2002) and ‘Brusselisation’ (Regelsberger, 2007a), respectively) in a process of de 
facto increasing involvement. In several evolutionary steps, political attention and personal re-
sources are shifted to the Brussels arena (Maurer et al., 2002) but this does not mean a ‘commu-
nitarisation’ in the strict sense, meaning that procedures are used which are known from the 
community method. Central to this view is the assumption that this development is irreversible 
– while remaining in the status quo is possible for some time, ‘spill-backs’ are excluded. In each 
treaty revision, member states give competences to the Union for more efficient problem-
solving, but at the same time they retain influence via the participation in several administrative 
and political bodies. The office of the High Representative in between the institutional triangle 
is the most visible example for such a “schizophrenia” (Klein & Wessels, 2006) and exemplifies 
par excellence an institutional fusion (Wessels, 2004). While the CFSP provisions of the Lisbon 
Treaty were not raised onto the next plateau (cf. Figure 1) institutional complexity and intercon-
nectedness have been enhanced. 
We would expect that some weaknesses of CFSP such as the external visibility and coherence 
and internal efficiency will be reduced by the Lisbon Treaty while other, new problems such as 
internal rivalry due to unspecific division of powers might increase (Klein & Wessels, 2006). 
The efficiency and general performance of the Union’s crisis management operations will have 
to be tested in actual moments of crisis providing the ‘right’ kind of challenges to the Union’s 
action capability. Even the role and political acceptability of the new office of the High Repre-
sentative and thus the capability of the Union to act as a global actor in the international system 
remain open.  
Of the three possible scenarios 1) a real step forward on the integration cascade; 2) refinement 
of the intergovernmental status quo and 3) an ongoing fusion (cf. above and Wessels, 2005: 
95f.), the masters of the treaty have chosen a combination of the second and third scenario. The 
‘imperfect outcome’ of the CFSP provisions in regard to internal efficiency and external repre-
sentation might thus lead to future adaptations even if treaty texts will not be changed. This 
could be the case in 2013 when the financial perspective has to be renegotiated and when the 
size of the Commission is to be reduced by 2014. It can be expected that these rules will be sub-
ject to further adaptations after a first test phase and/or crisis situations. Too many antagonisms 
can be detected between the pretension to be a ‘super power’ and the avoidance of a ‘super 
state’ (Blair, 2000). The Intergovernmental Conference did not give the Union the necessary in-
struments and institutions to fulfil the self-postulated aim to be a missionary community of 
norms. The options for efficient and effective action are still very limited. The 2007 reform 
would then document (just) another step on the same plateau of a ratchet fusion process (Wes-
sels, 2001) and queue in a line with the other treaty reforms in which the heads of state and gov-
ernment each time revised the constitutional architecture in an ‘upward’ (i.e. supranational) di-
rection while at the same time refining the intergovernmental structures and modes of govern-
ance. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty cannot be qualified as a ‘constitutional break-through’ but intro-
duces some remarkable innovations whose impact has to be measured after ratification. The 
ambiguity of the legal text might rather create new challenges in the future especially for the 
first holders of the new offices as President of the European Council and High Representative. | 31 
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